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Once upon a time
in the fine month of May, many years ago,
a princess – and not just any ordinary prin-
cess but a remarkably intelligent philoso-
pher-princess – sent a letter to a man re-
nowned for his profound metaphysical in-
sight asking a question that still puzzles
philosophers today, more than three cen-
turies later: how is our conscious, rational
mind related to the non-conscious matter
of our body? When the prominent man at
first provides a rather paltry answer about
the naturally experienced union of mind
and body, the princess promptly comments: 
“I admit that it would be easier for me to
concede matter and extension to the soul
than to concede the capacity to move a body
and to be moved by it to an immaterial
thing” (Shapiro 2007: 68 [72]).
The year is 1643, and the correspondents
are Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-
1680) and René Descartes (1596-1650).
55
Different Kinds 
of Matter(s)  
– Subjectivity, Body, and Ethics 
in Barad’s Materialism
BY RENÉ ROSFORT
Karen Barad’s agential realism 
offers an original view on nature.
This view is based on an “ethico-on-
to-epistem-ology” in which ethics,
ontology, and epistemology are not
separate levels of investigation. The
consequence of this conflated metho-
dological approach is a theory that –
despite its many merits – disregards
crucial aspects of human nature
(subjectivity and body) and neglects
the concrete problems of ethics.
This discussion of the abstruse interaction
of the matterless mind and the mindless
body marks the beginning of a seven-year
long correspondence about central philo-
sophical issues covering metaphysics, math-
ematics, ethics, and politics. 
Besides wanting to draw attention to
Elisabeth’s penetrating observations, de-
plorably all too often forgotten, I begin
with her question to Descartes because in
what follows I want to use some of her ob-
servations to articulate some of my con-
cerns regarding Karen Barad’s material
metaphysics. Elisabeth was among the first
philosophers in the dawn of the Western
scientific revolution to explicate the prob-
lem of how to account for a rational mind
in a strictly physical nature, and her acuity
is confirmed by the fact that her questions
are very much alive at the theoretical core
of contemporary philosophy. I shall look at
three interconnected issues that remain if
not neglected then at least unattended to in
Barad’s ambitious project, namely, subjec-
tivity, body, and ethics. These have been,
and still are, crucial issues for feminist
thinking, as well as for philosophy in gener-
al. I shall argue that the problems involved
in each of these issues point to serious flaws
in Barad’s ambition to completely revise
the traditional ontological and epistemo-
logical framework for thinking about physi-
cal nature and the existence of human be-
ings in nature. As a consequence of these
flaws, I shall venture the conclusion that
despite the obvious merits of Barad’s work,
contemporary feminist theorists need to
employ her ideas with caution, if we are to
avoid losing sight of disturbingly concrete
ethical problems that are still in need of
careful analysis.
My argument is developed in four steps.
First, I very briefly introduce Barad’s theo-
ry and its place in the development of con-
temporary feminism. In the following two
sections, I shall look more carefully at the
issues of subjectivity and the human body,
arguing that they are neglected or at least
misconstrued in Barad’s work. I conclude
with a brief consideration of some ethical
issues in contemporary gender studies that
may help us to see both the merits and lim-
its of Barad’s work. 
Obviously, within the restricted limits of
this brief article I shall not be able to pay
due respect to the breathtaking scope of
Barad’s knowledge or the details of her
analyses; neither do I possess the training
or ability to comment on her interpretation
of quantum physics. I shall, as mentioned,
merely concentrate on what I consider to
be serious problems in her conflated





A brief look at the development of two ma-
jor, and highly conflicting, currents in our
attempt to understand human nature may
provide an explanatory background against
which we can better assess Barad’s material-
ist theory.
The twentieth century can be read as the
scientific century par excellence. In the first
decades of the young century, physics and
mathematics made extraordinary advances
(mathematical set theory, general relativity,
quantum physics); in the period from the
1930s to 1950s the newly developed mole-
cular biology joined forces with genetics
and changed our view of human develop-
ment. In July 1969 the first human foot-
print made the moon familiar. The 1970s
and 1980s abounded with dazzling com-
puter calculations and surprising, some-
times quite fanciful, evolutionary syntheses
purporting to explain human behaviour
(first under the name of sociobiology, then
as evolutionary psychology). The closing
decade experienced colourful insight into
the living brain by the combined efforts of
the emerging computer sciences and neu-
roscience, and finally the turbulent century
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was crowned by the first draft of the much
advertised mapping of the human genome
on June 26, 2000. On the other hand, un-
derneath this amazing and seemingly un-
flagging scientific progress suspicious voices
began to grow louder. The horrible appli-
cations of scientific knowledge experienced
in the first half of the century (enhanced
weaponry, eugenics, allegedly ‘scientific’
race theories and gender ideologies, and
the nuclear bomb) led many intellectuals to
question the nature, scope, and limits of
the natural sciences and the unfathomable
technological advances. This general suspi-
cion crystallized in many theoretical forms
that are not easily disentangled from one
another (critical theory, second wave femi-
nism, post-colonial studies, deconstruction,
postmodernism, science studies, and many
more). Whereas the scientific enthusiasts
believe in the now rather precarious legend
of a steady, unwaveringly objective disclo-
sure of essential features of human nature,
the suspicious “legend bashers” (Kitcher
1993) emphasize the petrifying and oppres-
sive ideology involved in such a legend-
based view of scientific progress. In fact,
the suspicious took the idea of a universal
human nature to be an artificial construct
concocted by overheated propagandists
who were stubbornly blind to the complex-
ity of language, insensitive to the signifi-
cance of culture, and either hopelessly naive
or malignantly deaf to the voices of those
who suffer under the economically devised
schemes of biopolitics. This fight over what
it is to be human was simmering through-
out a major part of the century, came into
full blossom in the last quarter, and is still
with us today. 
One way to illustrate the tense dynamics
of this general antagonism is the literally
extreme movement of a pendulum. At the
one end of the pendulum swing, we find
the scientific enthusiasts advocating a uni-
versal or essentialist conception of human
nature with a focus on innate, and basically
unalterable, differences between women
and men, discrete and immutable differ-
ences of sexuality, gender dispositions, in-
telligence and other human features. At the
opposite end, we find the suspicious legend
bashers who vehemently contest such talk
about universal “nature” and about natural,
essential features or immutable differences,
and instead focus on the plasticity of hu-
man characteristics in the form of cultural
relativity, performative enactments, discur-
sive flexibility, and the inscrutable power of
language. I use the figure of a swinging
pendulum to illustrate this antagonism be-
cause – as anyone who has ever observed an
old clock or a metronome knows – a pen-
dulum swing only admits movement to ex-
treme positions; an equilibrated middle po-
sition is only possible once the pendulum
has come to a standstill – the clock’s mea-
surement of time ends, the tone dies away.
The rhythm of antagonism, particularly evi-
dent in (but by no means limited to) femi-
nist studies, is nourished by extreme posi-
tions, that is, nature or nurture, biology or
culture, immutability or change.
It is against this tense background that
the extraordinary appeal of Karen Barad’s
thinking becomes understandable. She does
not accept the traditional antagonisms or
fractured oppositions of the past. Instead
she proposes “a sense of connectivity
through the traces of variously entangled
threads and of the (re)workings of mutual
constitution and unending iterative recon-
figurings” (Barad 2010: 245).1 She is an
exquisitely well-cultured theoretical physi-
cist who writes with the beautiful ease of a
skilled novelist in combination with the un-
compromising verve of a pragmatic scien-
tist, and is thus able to conjure up tasty en-
tanglements of quantum physics, theatre,
poems, philosophy, politics, and feminism.
Her knowledge appears boundless, and the
limits of her explanatory scope can only be
probed by the heights of her vertiginous
aim, namely, to introduce nothing less than
a “lively new ontology”, in which:
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[T]he world’s radical aliveness comes to light
in an entirely nontraditional way that reworks
the nature of both relationality and aliveness
(vitality, dynamism, agency). This shift in on-
tology also entails a reconceptualization of
other core philosophical concepts such as
space, time, matter, dynamics, agency, struc-
ture, subjectivity, objectivity, knowing, inten-
tionality, discursivity, performativity, entan-
glement, and ethical engagement (33).
Barad’s work is dedicated to the develop-
ment of the new ontology, or rather an
“ethico-onto-epistem-ology”, in which
ethics, ontology, and epistemology are no
longer separate fields of study (89-90,
381). And although her theory is first and
foremost meant to be a contribution to
“science studies, feminist studies, and other
(inter)disciplinary studies” (25), Barad re-
peatedly credits it as a panacea for all the
ailments caused by “idealist or magical” be-
liefs in the “representationalist” dualism of
biology and culture, subjectivity and objec-
tivity, mind and body (e.g. 5, 23-5, 55, 70,
93, 131, 183, 221-2, 317-8, 391-4). Con-
trary to the reflective method with which
we have long tried to understand the world
and other people as discrete objects in op-
position to ourselves as experiencing sub-
jects, Barad operates with a transdiscipli-
nary diffractive methodology by means of
which the reflective distance between the
experienced object and the experiencing
subject is eliminated and object and subject
become part of the same material enact-
ment. Once we learn to put aside our (all
too) human tendency to consider ourselves
as individuals with our “own roster of non-
relational properties” who live in a world of
interacting “individual entities with sepa-
rately determinate properties” (55), we
shall be able to see only intra-acting, entan-
gled material phenomena without fixed
boundaries, structures or identities, which
are ever changing, shifting, and re(con)fig-
uring into new phenomena. Barad calls this
entirely new view of nature “agential real-
ism”, which, among other things, is “a
posthumanist account of performativity
that challenges the positioning of materiali-
ty as either a given or a mere effect of hu-
man agency. On an agential realist account,
materiality is an active factor in processes of
materialization”; or in the straightforward
manner characteristic of her style, “matter
is not a fixed essence; rather, matter is sub-
stance in its intra-active becoming – not a
thing but a doing, a congealing of agency”
(183-84). 
She draws the main support for her argu-
ment from the enchanting subatomic world
of quantum physics, which leaves most
readers breathlessly behind in comprehen-
sion, but if one is to put a plump finger on
her delicate theory in order to point out
her principal aim, I would say that it can be
boiled down to the ambition of dissolving
solid differences and entrenched distinc-
tions in order to enhance the “possibilities
of change” (35). 
This is surely not a new ambition in fe-
minist thinking, and it is an attitude toward
which I am quite sympathetic. We do in-
deed need to overcome stale prejudices, os-
sified habits of thinking, and not least the
harmful trajectory of ideological precon-
ceptions about (human) nature. What is
new is Barads background as a physicist,
and her methodological stance that can be
summed up in her own slogan “Language
has been granted too much power” (132).
Contrary to the concern with the subtleties
of language and the general suspicion
about science that characterized much fe-
minist thinking in the second half of the
twentieth century, Barad uses the most
profound – some would say, also the most
obscure – branch of the natural sciences,
quantum physics, to establish a materialism
that overcomes the opposition of nature
and culture at the heart of contemporary
feminism. If we return to the metaphor of
the pendulum swing of antagonism de-
scribed above, Barad’s material feminism
can be read as an ambitious attempt to en-
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compass both extremes of the pendulum
swing, nature as well as culture, without
forcing the pendulum to what she consid-
ers to be the futile standstill of a reflective
middle position. The diffractive entangle-
ment of her lively quantum materialism en-
sures that everything is culture and every-
thing is nature, and her posthumanist con-
viction allows her to discard traditional
philosophical discussions about subjectivity,
body, and individuality as unhappy by-
products of an inadequate understanding of
nature. Once we adopt her “ethico-onto-
epistem-ology”, we are finally enabled to
understand – as she writes on the final page
of her long book – that:
A delicate tissue of ethicality runs through
the marrow of being. There is no getting
away from ethics – mattering is an integral
part of the ontology of the world in its dy-
namic presencing. Not even a moment exists
on its own. “This” and “that,” “here” and
“now,” don’t preexist what happens but
come alive with each meeting. The world and
its possibilities for becoming are remade with
each moment. If we hold on to the belief that
the world is made of individual entities, it is
hard to see how even our best, most well-in-
tentioned calculations for right action can
avoid tearing holes in the delicate tissue
structure of entanglements that the lifeblood
of the world runs through. Intra-acting re-
sponsibly as part of the world means taking
account of the entangled phenomena that are
intrinsic to the world’s vitality and being re-
sponsive to the possibilities that might help
us and it flourish (396).
In what follows, I will try to articulate
some of my concerns regarding this at-
tempt to conflate ethics, ontology, and
epistemology. Different kinds of questions
are at work in each of these fields of in-
quiry, and I shall use Princess Elisabeth’s
concerns about the fragile relation of the
mind and the body to articulate my main
point, namely, that – in spite of Barad’s
methodological conflation – various ques-
tions about subjectivity, the body, and indi-
viduality still matter to contemporary femi-
nism. I shall start with the complex episte-
mology involved in the subjective experi-
ence of sadness. The next section will deal
with the consequences that this complexity
has for our study of the ontology of the hu-
man body. The last two sections then con-
clude with some brief ethical considerations
of the importance of subjectivity and body
in relation to how feminism conceives the
individual.  
THE SUBJECTIVITY OF SAD(NESS) 
MATTERS
In the spring of 1645, Descartes was in-
formed that Elisabeth had suffered from a
recurrent physical malaise, characterized by
“a low-grade fever, accompanied by a dry
cough”, which he perceptively diagnoses to
be “sadness [tristesse]” (Shapiro 2007: 86
[95-6]). Elisabeth was well aware that her
physical symptoms were caused by the
troubles of her mind. She had been cau-
tious about admitting this to the doctors
who examined her, and she confesses that
‘[e]ven if they had been smart enough to
suspect the part that my mind plays in the
disorder of the body, I would not have the
frankness to admit it to them at all”
(Shapiro 2007: 88 [98]). 
Elisabeth’s disturbing sadness is interest-
ing because it allows us to see why ethics,
ontology, and epistemology are not as easi-
ly conflated as is the case in Barad’s
“ethico-onto-epistem-ology”. 
Despite the fact that a metaphysical dual-
ism of mind and body may be a thing of
the past, and the embodied mind has be-
come an almost undisputed philosophical
as well as scientific assumption, most peo-
ple can recognize Elisabeth’s puzzlement
concerning the relation of the mind and
the body. Most of us readily accept that –
ontologically speaking – our mind is our
brain. The problem is, though, that this
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ontological certainty does not help us to
cope with the phenomenological fact that
we somehow feel that there is more to our
mind than the grey matter of our brain. Al-
though some biologically oriented psychia-
trists might try to assure us that the devas-
tating sadness accompanying severe depres-
sion is the result of imbalances in the neu-
robiological underpinnings of our con-
scious mind, such explanations seem some-
how unsuitable for solving the experiential
problem of sadness. I may accept that sad-
ness is caused by the biological functions of
my brain, but this acceptance does not alter
the phenomenological fact that my most
personal concerns (thoughts about the past
and the future, jealousy, low self-esteem,
economical insecurity, and so on) are some-
how critical to the specific kind of sadness
that I feel. 
Thus, even though a neurobiological ex-
planation of sadness may be ontologically
true, this does not help us very much when
it comes to the epistemological subtleties of
our subjective experience of sadness. In
fact, subjectivity makes ontology, that is,
the question of what is really real, highly
problematic. What is the accurate descrip-
tion of sadness? Is it the careful description
of complex neuromodulators (the break-
down or reuptake inhibition of monoamine
transmitters such as serotonin, dopamine,
histamine, etc.), or the just as careful de-
scription of the experiential features of sad-
ness (weary thoughts, heavy body, irritable
mood, lack of appetite, etc.)? This is still an
intensely debated question in psychiatry,
which shows that the embodied mind re-
mains just as much a problem as it is a fact.
Explanations of the mind and the brain are
still two different enterprises. And this is
why subjectivity matters. I am sad and you
are sad, and while we both know what the
other means by sadness, our respective ex-
periences of sadness may be entirely differ-
ent. 
The phenomenology of sadness is partic-
ularly complex because there are some fea-
tures of what we call sadness that appear to
be rooted in more or less universal biologi-
cal functions, while there are other features
which change from culture to culture, and
again features which are different from per-
son to person. This complexity makes it
necessary to operate with distinct explana-
tory layers when we approach such a fragile
phenomenon as human sadness. Epistemo-
logical, ontological, and ethical investiga-
tions of sadness (and of most other human
emotions and thoughts) are separate mat-
ters, and any attempt to conflate the vari-
ous methodologies of such investigations
risks losing sight of what is really at stake –
namely, to understand and cope with sad-
ness. If our epistemological approach to
sadness (how do we experience sadness?) is
too intimately entangled with an ontologi-
cal (what is sadness?) and an ethical (how
should we behave when we are sad?), we
very easily end up with an explanation that
is both reductive (sadness is just a malfunc-
tioning of your brain) and normatively bi-
ased (the way you behave when you are sad
is inappropriate or simply wrong). 
Elisabeth’s reluctance about admitting to
her doctors the role that her sad thoughts
play in her bodily illness is an example of
delicate issues involved in explanations of
human problems. Every problem is always
an entangled product of epistemology, on-
tology, and ethics to begin with. The doc-
tors’ understanding of Elisabeth’s illness,
their diagnosis, and their advice were un-
doubtedly informed and shaped by their
seventeenth-century Western beliefs about
physical nature, medical practice, the hu-
man body, the soul, and not least the inferi-
or nature of women. More than three hun-
dred years have passed, and doctors, scien-
tists, and politicians are still confronted
with entangled human problems that are all
too often investigated and handled in re-
ductive and normatively biased ways that
do additional harm to – and sometimes
even destroy – the suffering person in-
volved. I would venture the claim that our
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best chance of investigating and coping
with human problems is to disentangle the
different methodological layers at work in
our fragile conception of what it means to
be human. Barad’s recourse to the lively
“ethico-onto-epistem-ology” of quantum
physics, and the conflated methodological
approach of agential realism, points explic-
itly in the opposite direction. Her insis-
tence on the inescapable entanglement of
phenomena engrained in the lively intra-ac-
tions of quantum physics might be a im-
pressive (meta)physical theory about mat-
ter, but it is no help against the more con-
crete and serious problems of Elisabeth –
or those of any other human being, for that
matter. 
To further support this rather harsh
claim I suggest that we look at how the
persistence of subjectivity complicates our
conception of the human body – and of the




Later in the letter to Descartes, quoted at
the beginning of the previous section, Eli-
sabeth expresses her gratitude to Descartes
because he intends, as she writes, “to cure
my body with my soul” (Shapiro 2007: 89
[99]). Some paragraphs earlier, though, she
had emphasized the difficulty of such a
cognitive therapy – in particular in view of
the fact that she is a woman: 
Know thus that I have a body imbued with a
large part of the weaknesses of my sex [des
faiblesses de mon sexe], so that it is affected
very easily by the afflictions of the soul and
has none of the strength to bring itself back
into line, as it is of a temperament subject to
obstructions (Shapiro 2007: 88 [98]). 
Although Lisa Shapiro, who has studied the
correspondence carefully, detects a hint of
irony in Elisabeth’s statement, she never-
theless encourages us to take seriously “her
internalization of a kind of sexist attitude”
(Shapiro 1999: 511). Whether she is ironic
or not, Elisabeth’s comments reveal not
only the prejudices about the female mind
and body in the seventeenth century, but
also a problematic feature of bodily experi-
ence that is still very much alive today. 
Once again, despite Barad’s rather harsh
rejection of phenomena conceived as ob-
jects “in the Kantian or phenomenological
sense” (128), phenomenology can be help-
ful to articulate a basic problem of human
embodiment, particularly if we add a whiff
of what she rejects as the untenable “Kant-
ian noumena-phenomena distinction” (33,
128, 375).
Traditionally, phenomenology operates
with a basic distinction in our understand-
ing of human embodiment: the subjective,
unthematized, living body (Leib) and the
objective, thematized body (Körper). This
distinction is used as a way to articulate the
complexity involved in the experience of
the body as, on the one hand, the pre-re-
flective organ through which I interact with
the world, i.e., the body as mine, and the
body as an object on a par with other ob-
jects in the world, i.e., subjected to the
anonymous laws of physics and biology
(Zahavi 1999: 91-109). In other words,
my experience of my body is highly am-
bivalent: it is mine in the most intimate
sense of the word, and still it is also the in-
timidating object for alienating diseases and
ultimately death. My body is in this sense
both a phenomenon and a noumenon
(here understood in the firm Kantian sense
as that which lies beyond the reach of my
possible experience and thus my under-
standing). 
This ambivalent character of human em-
bodiment is once again an expression of the
abstruse relation between the mind and the
body, and the ambivalence has important
consequences for how a person lives with
her or his body. My body is an inescapable
part of who I am, but just as Elisabeth
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(ironically) complains about the gendered
‘weaknesses’ of her body, many people suf-
fer under the rather unexplainable, contin-
gent, and sometimes alienating character of
their particular bodies. This bodily unease
varies from rather superficial aesthetic con-
cerns over deeply frustrating feelings about
personal identity to terrible illnesses. Some
feel that they are too short, others that they
are too tall, some that their nose is too
prominent, others suffer under premature
baldness, cystic acne, underdeveloped sexu-
al organs, overdeveloped ears, and so forth.
Tragically, there are persons who are born
with a body that is genetically determined
to develop agonizing and terminal illnesses,
and no less painfully tragic is the fate of
those innumerable children who are born
in regions of the world where early malnu-
trition and environmental pollution are the
order of the day and severely inhibit – and
often irreversibly destroy – the develop-
ment of vital bodily organs. Why is this
cruel contingency attached to our embod-
ied existence? No matter how hard we
think about our body, and often because it
is in grievous opposition to our best or
most intimate intentions, the nature of the
human body and the contingent place in
the world where this body was born remain
noumena in the unmistakably Kantian
sense, that is, unfathomable questions. 
I shall conclude with a brief considera-
tion of a related bodily problem of rele-
vance to contemporary gender studies. It is
an issue that involves epistemological, on-
tological, and ethical considerations, but al-
so a highly delicate issue that necessitates a
methodological separation of these differ-
ent considerations. 
(THE) INDIVIDUAL MATTERS
Why does all this matter to contemporary
feminism, and to the use that it makes of
Barad’s thinking? Once again we may take
our lead from Princess Elisabeth. To cure
Elisabeth’s suffering body with her soul,
Descartes recommends the reading of the
Stoic philosopher Seneca, who taught that
all evils can be overcome and true happi-
ness be gained if only we follow the serene
path of rational thinking. We have already
seen that Elisabeth is quite sceptic about
such a cognitive therapy. And some months
later, in August 1645, when she has even-
tually read the recommended work by
Seneca, she restates her scepticism: “I do
not yet know how to rid myself of the
doubt that one can arrive at the true happi-
ness [la béatitude] of which you speak
without the assistance of that which does
not depend absolutely on the will”
(Shapiro 2007: 100 [114]).
Barad’s theory of intra-active entangle-
ments is crowned with a sketch of “an
ethics of mattering” (391-6) that reworks
central Lévinasian themes of the absolute
Other. She uses these themes to argue
against the metaphysics of individualism
and for the idea that “[t]here are no singu-
lar causes. And there are no individual
agents of change”, which means that
“[r]esponsibility entails an ongoing respon-
siveness to the entanglements of self and
other” (394). Although I completely agree
with the last part, which I consider to be
the most admirable feature of Barad’s theo-
ry, I remain very sceptic about the way she
wants to arrive at this responsible entangle-
ment of self and other. Like Elisabeth, I am
concerned with the significance of contin-
gency. In spite of the alleged quantum
‘fact’ that we are all (humans as well as oth-
er than human) entangled by the “delicate
tissue of ethicality” that “runs through the
marrow of being” (396), the subtle pro-
foundness of this ‘fact’ of ethicality is not
of much help when faced with the contin-
gency often tragically at work in our em-
bodied existence. 
Ethics matters exactly because of the
contingency involved in our individuality. I
am who I am with all the particular and
contingent features of my individual nature.
I may want to be a different individual, but
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I am to a large degree stuck with this spe-
cific kind of individuality (I was born in
Denmark, I am a man, I embody certain
physical characteristics, a particular tem-
perament and certain desires, feelings, be-
liefs, and ideas). And as Elisabeth writes, my
true happiness seems to be beyond the sway
of my will, and deeply entangled with these
contingent features of my individuality, and
with how my individual subjectivity is en-
tangled with the individuality of the other
person. In order to find an ethical path that
secures the possibility of a more just and
less tragic entanglement of individual per-
sons, we need to acknowledge the ethical
significance of irreplaceable persons with
different characters, dreams, and desires
who think and feel themselves as individu-
als. Among the contingent, but also persis-
tent, features of our individual subjectivity
are our feelings of sexuality and gender.
I do not think that an ethics that wishes
to deal with the concrete personal, societal,
and political problems of our sexuality and
gender should work to dissolve individuali-
ty into delicate quantum intra-actions at
“the marrow of being” or conflate nature
and culture to enhance an amorphous pos-
sibility of change. On the contrary, a con-
crete ethics of gender should approach the
problems at the rough surface of the entan-
gled existence of individual beings. To un-
derstand how to deal with problems of gen-
der and sexuality, this ethics starts from an
investigation of why culture and nature im-
pose different limits on our understanding
and agency, why the relation of mind and
body is so fragile, why subjectivity matters,
why our body matters, and finally why dis-
agreements, prejudices, condemnations,
and political distortions still debar the pos-
sibility of responsible interaction and mutu-
al acceptance from the intra-acting entan-
glement of our hearts. In other words, a
gender-sensitive ethics should be an ethics
of disentanglement that works towards
solving the problems involved in the entan-
glement of different matter(s). 
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, I will try to make my
reservations concerning the use of Barad’s
methodology in gender studies more con-
crete by returning to the phenomenon of
sadness. Earlier I insisted upon the subjec-
tive character of sadness, and on how the
subjectivity of sadness entails biological and
ethical implications, which risk subsiding
into the entangled background of Barad’s
account. To understand the phenomeno-
logical, biological, and ethical dimensions
of the disruptive sadness provoked by one’s
sexuality or gender such as, for instance,
gender dysphoria, it is necessary, I would
argue, that we examine those dimensions
separately. As central parts of the mental ill-
ness diagnosed as gender identity disorders,
these three dimensions of gender dysphoria
have been clinically described as ‘strong
and persistent feelings of discomfort with
one’s assigned sex [phenomenological], the
desire to possess the body of the other sex
[biological], and the desire to be regarded
by others as a member of the other sex
[ethical]’ (American Psychiatric Association
2000: 535). Although I am sceptical about
the scientific and ethical validity of psychi-
atric diagnoses concerning sexuality and
gender, I do not think that we can ignore
these dimensions of the concrete despair
that many people feel about their sexuality
and gender. The complexity of a person’s
suffering from gender dysphoria renders bi-
ological taxonomies and societal concepts,
norms, and conventions about sexuality
and gender highly instable. I am a man
who feels that I am a woman. Those feel-
ings are further complicated by the experi-
ential fact that my gender and my sexuality
sometimes come apart in the fragile texture
of my emotional life, and challenge biologi-
cal and societal paradigms of ‘normality’.
Biologically I am a heterosexual male who
feels attracted to women, but personally I
am a homosexual female who longs to be
desired, recognized, and accepted as the
person that I am. My identity as an individ-
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ual person is what is at stake in my sexual
and gendered feelings. Despairing about
my gender includes, among other things,
ambivalent feelings about the concrete sub-
jective, biological, and normative difficul-
ties that I experience in my possibility of
challenging my own and other people’s
conceptions of ‘normality’. An approach to
the suffering involved in gender dysphoria
therefore needs to recognize that we are
dealing with an ambivalent, albeit painfully
concrete, phenomenon with at least three
distinct levels, each of which requires its
own methodological approach: the phe-
nomenological structures of how gender
and sexuality affect my experience of the
world, other people, and myself (e.g.
Heinämaa 2003); the biological functions
of sexuality and gender (e.g. Hines 2004);
and the ethical aspect of being a gendered
and sexual person (e.g. Irigaray 1984). On-
ly by such a disentangled approach can we
hope to shed light on the experiential am-
bivalence of our gendered and sexual suf-
ferings, understand the role biology plays
in this ambivalence, and face the normative
challenges involved in our work towards
formulating an ethics that no longer ne-
glects the existential fragility of those who
are most in need of understanding and
recognition.
Throughout this article I have insisted
on the individual because I believe that the
concrete problems of the individual person
should always be at the centre of the varie-
gated epistemological and ontological ap-
proaches involved in an interdisciplinary re-
search field such as gender studies. All too
often the individual person has been lost
from sight in the century-long battle of na-
ture versus nurture, biology versus culture.
What I admire and applaud in Barad’s
thinking is, in fact, her serious attempt to
establish a methodological foundation that
may attenuate the entrenched antagonism
between cultural and biological perspec-
tives, which continues to bedevil our en-
deavour to understand gender and sexuali-
ty. As such her work is an important contri-
bution to the growing awareness of the
need to reconceptualize the conflictual re-
lation of biology and culture in our con-
ception of human gender and sexuality. I
remain sceptical, however, about the con-
flation of ontology, epistemology, and
ethics at the heart of her agential realism.
The sheer scope of her “ethico-onto-epis-
tem-ological” proposal, together with her
harsh dismissal of what she considers to be
anthropocentric prejudices of traditional
philosophy, makes her project insensitive
both to valuable insights from the tradition
that she seeks to overturn and to the con-
crete ethical, ontological, and epistemolo-
gical problems of individual persons who
live with the (diffractive) effects of that tra-
dition. Solid scientific theories (from natur-
al science to cultural anthropology) are
rarely, if ever, wholesale rejections of what
went before; rather, they are the product of
patient endeavours to improve on what is
right or beneficial and mend what is wrong
or damaging in the tradition out of which
they grew. 
My initial concern that feminist theorists
should be careful when adopting Barad’s
materialist account is therefore part of my
general worry regarding the scope and a-
personal character of Barad’s approach. So
I believe that while contemporary feminism
can only benefit from Barad’s attempt to
rethink the antagonism between biology
and culture, feminist theorists should nev-
ertheless be suspicious about her method-
ological proposal to conflate the ontologi-
cal, ethical, and epistemological aspects of
the interdisciplinary field of gender studies
of which their theories are a part. 
NOTES
1. If nothing else is indicated, all page references
in the text to Karen Barad are to (Barad 2007).
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SUMMARY
Different Kinds of Matter(s) – Subjectivity,
Body, and Ethics in Barad’s Materialism
This article questions the methodological con-
flation at work in Karen Barad’s agential
realism. Barad’s immense appeal is first ex-
plained against the tense background of the
nature/culture antagonism in the twentieth
century. Then, by using some of the penetrat-
ing observations of a seventeen-century phi-
losopher, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia,
Barad’s “ethico-onto-epistem-ology” is exam-
ined and subsequently criticized for disre-
garding the persistence of subjectivity, dissolv-
ing the ambivalence of the bodily matter(s),
and neglecting the need for concrete individ-
uality in ethics. 
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